Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive by Briscoe, Robert Eamon
Mind & Language, Vol. 23 No. 4  September 2008, pp. 457–497.
© 2008 The Author
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive 
 ROBERT EAMON  BRISCOE 
 Abstract :  In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception 
recently defended by Alva  Noë (2004) . I argue  inter alia  that the enactive account falsely 
identiﬁ es an object ’ s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly 
assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously 
misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further 
that noticing an object ’ s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both 
perceptual and imaginative elements — an act of what I call  ‘ make-perceive ’ . 
 1. Introduction: The Sense-Datum Theory of Perception Redux 
 In his recent  Action in Perception  (2004), Alva Noë argues that inﬂ uential criticisms 
of the sense-datum theory by  Austin (1962), Gibson (1979), Strawson (1979) , and 
others actually  ‘ leave unscathed what is really the sense-datum theory ’ s core idea: 
that perceiving is a way of ﬁ nding out how things are from how they look or 
sound or, more generally, appear  … . Looks, sounds, feels — appearances generally —
 are perceptually basic ’ (2004, p. 81). According to Noë, an object ’ s visually 
apparent shape is the shape of the patch that would occlude the object on a plane 
perpendicular to the line of sight, i.e. the shape of the patch projected by the 
object on the frontal plane in accordance with the laws of linear perspective. Noë 
calls this the object ’ s  ‘ perspectival shape ’ (P-shape). An object ’ s visually apparent 
size, in turn, is the size of the patch projected by the object on the frontal plane. 
Noë calls this the object ’ s  ‘ perspectival size ’ (P-size). 1 Appearances are perceptually 
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 1  Note that there are inﬁ nitely many planes, each at different distance in depth, on which an object could 
be occluded by a suitably shaped patch. It follows that P-size is relative to plane of occlusion. (Compare 
the sizes of the patches that would occlude the Eiffel Tower on planes 50 and 5,000 feet from its base.) 
Noë is aware of this difﬁ culty. Nonetheless he maintains that  ‘ there  is  a single apparent size of an 
object — namely, the unique way that an object looks with respect to size from a particular position. 
This is secured by phenomenology ’ (2004, p. 84). The problem is that the notion of P-size was 
presumably intended as a theoretical replacement for the notion of  ‘ apparent size ’ or  ‘ size in the visual 
ﬁ eld ’ . So, if phenomenology does in fact pre-theoretically secure the claim that an object has but a single 
apparent size, then this just suggests that P-size is a bad theoretical replacement for apparent size. 
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basic because in order to see an object ’ s actual spatial properties it is necessary both 
to see its P-properties and to understand how its P-properties would vary (undergo 
transformation) with variation in one ’ s point of view: 
 To see a circular plate from an angle, for example, is to see something with an 
elliptical P-shape and it is to understand how that perspectival shape would 
vary as a function of one ’ s (possible or actual) movements with respect to the 
perceived object (2004, p. 84). 
 Similarly: 
 To see the actual size of a thing is to see how its perspectival size varies as we 
move (2004, p. 84). 
 Seeing, as thus characterized on Noë ’ s enactive, sensorimotor account of visual 
perception, is a  ‘ two-step ’ process:  ‘ How they (merely) appear to be plus 
sensorimotor knowledge gives you things as they are ’ (2004, p. 164). 
 The enactive account, it seems clear, bears more than a superﬁ cial resemblance 
to the sense-datum theory of perception. Crucially, both the enactive account and 
the sense-datum theory adhere to the following  phenomenological  and  perceptual 
 claims: 
 Phenomenological : An object ’ s visually apparent shape is the shape of the patch that 
would occlude the object on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight.  ‘ All 
bodies, which discover themselves to the eye ’ , as David Hume puts it,  ‘ appear as 
if painted on a plain surface ’ ( 1740/1975 , 1.2.5). Thus, when viewed from an 
oblique angle, round coins are supposed to appear elliptical, rectangular tabletops 
are supposed to appear trapezoidal, and so on. It follows from the phenomenological 
claim that visually apparent shapes are uniformly  ‘ ﬂ at ’ or 2D. 
 Perceptual : Whenever an object visually appears   -shaped to a perceiver, then 
this is because the perceiver  sees  something — an  ‘ appearance ’ or  ‘ look ’ — that 
really is   -shaped. Thus Noë writes:  ‘ P-properties are themselves  objects of 
sight , that is, things that we see. They are visible. From where you stand, you 
can see the P-shape of the plate, and you can distinguish this from its actual 
shape ’ (2004, p. 83). Note that the perceptual claim is not merely that we see 
or are otherwise aware  that  a certain 2D ellipse would occlude the plate when 
viewed from an angle. The latter claim would not imply that the plate itself 
actually looks elliptical to us. 
 In the writings of the sense-datum theorists, the two claims serve to motivate what 
A. D. Smith has called  ‘ One of the most notable features of both philosophy and 
psychology throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ’ , namely,  ‘ the 
almost universal denial that we are immediately aware through sight of objects 
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arrayed in three-dimensional space ’ (2000b, p. 481). On this view, the immediate 
objects of visual perception are, strictly speaking, rather 2D, colored expanses.  ‘ We 
 see  nothing but ﬂ at colours ’ , as John Ruskin puts it in a well-known passage from 
 The Elements of Drawing  ( 1856/1971 , p. 27). 
 In Noë ’ s recent  ‘ Real Presence ’ (forthcoming), the two claims serve to motivate 
the view that an object ’ s 3D shape and voluminousness are  ‘ present as absent ’ in 
visual experience. Consider the case of viewing a silver dollar slanted in depth. 
According to Noë, the coin ’ s circular, 3D shape is  absent  from our visual 
experience — ‘ there is ’ , he says,  ‘ no seeing the coin ’ s circularity from an angle ’ 
(ms. p. 17) — because the coin ’ s visually apparent shape is its elliptical, 2D P-shape. 
At the same time, the coin ’ s  ‘ strictly unperceived circularity ’ (ms. p. 7) is  present  or, 
as Noë sometimes says,  ‘ available ’ in our visual experience because we are able to 
see the coin ’ s P-shape and we understand how its P-shape would vary as we move. 
In general, such movement-dependent variation in an object ’ s 2D P-shape and our 
implicit knowledge thereof constitutes the  ‘ real presence ’ of the object ’ s 3D shape 
in visual experience. Or so Noë argues. 
 In this paper, I critically examine and assess the enactive account of visual 
perception. In §2, I begin by criticizing Noë ’ s proposal that in order to see an 
object ’ s 3D shape it is necessary to possess knowledge of the object ’ s  ‘ sensorimotor 
proﬁ le ’ , of the way the object ’ s 2D P-shape would undergo change with variation 
in one ’ s point of view. This proposal, I argue, mistakenly assimilates visual shape 
perception, i.e. our ability to  see  the orientation of an object ’ s visible surfaces in 
depth, to volumetric object recognition, i.e. our ability to  identify  the object ’ s 
volumetric shape from any of indeﬁ nitely many different possible perspectives on 
the object. This error, I then try to show, is in fact symptomatic of a broader 
confusion about the role of bodily action in spatially contentful visual perception. 
 In §3, I argue that there are good empirical reasons to reject the claim — strikingly 
at variance with the post-Gibsonian tradition in vision science — that an object ’ s 
visually apparent shape is identical with its 2D P-shape. Contrary to pronouncements 
made by Noë, I show that there is no credible evidence that  ‘ genuinely naïve ’ 
perceivers would in fact take round coins presented at an angle to be elliptical. 
Indeed, studies of neonatal vision suggest that just the opposite is the case. In §4, I 
then criticize the weaker phenomenological claim that, in seeing 3D objects, we are 
 able  to see their P-shapes. In general, P-shapes are not properties that 3D objects 
(as opposed to pictures of those objects) can literally be seen to instance. That said, 
I allow that there is a sense in which we are sometimes able to notice an object ’ s 
P-shape. Purposing to notice an object ’ s P-shape, I speculatively propose, involves an 
act of what I call  ‘ make-perceive ’ . To make-perceive an object ’ s P-shape is to 
project or superimpose an image of the object ’ s 2D P-shape constructed  ‘ off-line ’ 
in imagination on one ’ s  ‘ on-line ’ visual experience of the object ’ s 3D shape. Noë, 
I suggest, mistakenly identiﬁ es the shape of a 2D patch that one  imagines  while 
viewing the object with the shape that the object itself visually appears to instance. 
 According to Noë, P-properties are  ‘ perceptually basic ’ (2004, p. 81). The enactive 
account, however, takes for granted our ability perceptually to individuate or 
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 ‘ segment ’ an object ’ s P-shape, i.e. its perspective projection on the frontal plane. In 
§§5-6, I show that phenomenological and experimental studies provide compelling 
evidence that our ﬁ rst, conscious visual awareness of the world is perceptually 
organized in terms of visible surfaces arrayed and oriented  in depth . Indeed, our 
ability perceptually to individuate discrete P-shapes on the frontal plane, I argue, is 
psychologically dependent on our ability to perceive the 3D organization of the 
scene projected on the plane. But, if this is right, then P-shapes cannot play the 
perceptually basic role conferred on them by the enactive account. In §7, I conclude 
with some brief remarks on the  ‘ perspectival ’ character of visual experience. 
 2. Visual Shape Perception versus Volumetric Object Recognition 
 I begin with the claim that in order to see an object ’ s 3D shape it is necessary to 
possess knowledge of the object ’ s  ‘ sensorimotor proﬁ le ’ , of the way the object ’ s 
appearance, i.e. its 2D P-shape, would undergo transformation with variation in 
one ’ s point of view. Noë writes: 
 The sensorimotor proﬁ le of an object is the way its appearance changes as you 
move with respect to it (strictly speaking, it is the way sensory stimulation 
varies as you move). All solid, opaque objects have sensorimotor proﬁ les in 
just this sense. As we get to more complicated forms, such as animal bodies, 
plants, and so forth, the mathematics needed to determine the sensorimotor 
proﬁ le of an object gets more complicated. Our visual perceptual skills, 
however, are that sophisticated, encompassing these complex (but ultimately 
manageable) relationships. 
 In this way the enactive approach explains the perceptual presence of shape, 
that is, how visual experience can present objects to us as having three-
dimensionality, volume, and shape (2004, p. 78). 
 The approach is illustrated by means of the following example: 
 When you move with respect to a plate, its proﬁ le changes.  … Our appreciation 
of its actual shape consists in our perception of its proﬁ le and our understanding of 
the way the proﬁ le, or apparent shape, depends on movement. We may say, in a 
case such as this, that we are able to experience the shape of the plate, to see it, 
because we grasp, implicitly, the sensorimotor proﬁ le of the plate. Our grasp of the 
plate ’ s sensorimotor proﬁ le makes its shape available in experience (2004, p. 78). 
 Seeing an object ’ s actual, 3D shape, on this view, then, crucially involves matching 
its 2D P-shape to a certain (presumably learned) sensorimotor proﬁ le. Whether or 
not one has matched the object ’ s P-shape to the correct sensorimotor proﬁ le — and, 
so, whether or not one has formed the correct sensorimotor expectations — only 
becomes apparent as one moves in relation to the object. 
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 Before proceeding, it is necessary to point out that assessment of the enactive 
account is signiﬁ cantly complicated by Noë ’ s tendency to speak interchangeably of 
distal P-properties (or  ‘ looks ’ ), on the one hand, and physicalistically characterizable, 
proximal sensory stimulations, on the other. Thus, in the passage quoted above, he 
writes:  ‘ The sensorimotor proﬁ le of an object is the way its  appearance  changes as 
you move with respect to it (strictly speaking, it is the way  sensory stimulation  varies 
as you move) ’ . The difference in locution, however, is by no means inconsequential. 
Indeed, it isn ’ t  prima facie  obvious how the different characterizations are to be 
related. P-properties, according to the enactive account, are distal, relational 
properties of the objects we see.  ‘ If there is a mind/world divide  … ’ , Noë writes, 
 ‘ then P-properties are on the world side of the divide ’ (2004, p. 83). Moreover, 
the enactive account clearly assumes that they are visible:  ‘ P-properties are 
themselves  objects of sight , that is, things that we see ’ (2004, p. 83). Sensory 
stimulations, by contrast, are proximal, subpersonal vehicles of visual perception. 
They are not objects of sight. Quite different, if not incommensurable, notions of 
 ‘ sensorimotor proﬁ le ’ and, so, of  ‘ sensorimotor understanding ’ would thus seem to 
be implied by the two characterizations. 
 Putting this preliminary interpretative difﬁ culty to the side, the ﬁ rst, and most 
general, objection to the enactive account, I would suggest, is that it mistakenly 
assimilates the theoretical problems respectively posed by visual shape perception 
and volumetric object recognition. In consequence, the enactive account seriously 
 ‘ over-intellectualizes ’ perception: it elides the cognitive requirements of  seeing  an 
object ’ s visible 3D shape with the cognitive requirements of being able to  identify 
 the object ’ s volumetric shape from any of indeﬁ nitely many different possible 
perspectives on the object. 
 Generally speaking, the problem of 3D visual shape perception is the problem 
of how — on the basis of multiple, independently variable sources of information in 
the light — we are able to see the orientation in depth of an object ’ s visible, i.e. 
non-occluded, surfaces. Sources of depth-speciﬁ c information include binocular 
disparity (stereopsis), motion parallax, perspective gradients, occlusion cues, texture, 
reﬂ ections, shadows, and, to a lesser extent, accommodation, convergence, and 
 ‘ blur ’ (see §3 below). Explaining how perception of 3D shape is enabled by 
nonconscious processing of these sources of information is one of the fundamental 
problems of  ‘ mid-level ’ vision or  ‘ surface representation ’ as it is sometimes called 
( Nakayama  et al. , 1995; Nakayama, 1999; Anderson, 2003; Pylyshyn, 2003 ). 
 In contrast, the problem of volumetric object recognition is the problem of how 
we are able to identify an object ’ s volumetric (solid) shape on the basis of any of 
indeﬁ nitely many possible 2D  ‘ images ’ or  ‘ views ’ of the object. 2 For example, we 
 2  The relevant views are 2D because they are typically assumed not to contain information about 
the relative distances and orientations of the object ’ s visible surfaces in depth. For an argument 
that the problem of volumetric object recognition as premised on this assumption is ill posed, 
see  Nakayama  et al. , 1995 . This argument will play an important part in §§5-6 below. 
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are reliably able to identify an object as a coffeepot, or a car, or a chair, whether 
we see it from in front, from above, from the side, etc. Since this ﬂ exible 
identiﬁ catory ability is not wholly input-driven, i.e. is not wholly dependent on 
information in the light available to the eyes, but rather also depends on stored, 
object-speciﬁ c knowledge, volumetric object recognition is standardly regarded as 
a  ‘ top-down ’ process. Explaining how the process is psychologically implemented 
is one of the fundamental problems of high-level vision. For general discussion, see 
 Marr, 1982; Kosslyn, 1994 ; and  Ullman, 1996 . 
 It seems reasonably clear that our ability to perceive the orientation of an object ’ s 
visible surfaces in depth does not in general depend on our having the ability to 
identify its volumetric shape as that of a previously encountered object (or kind of 
object). Indeed, this is why we are able accurately to perceive the completely 
novel shape of a rock formation at the beach, or a cloud, or an abstract sculpture. 
Failure or inability to identify an object thus need not by itself imply any properly 
 visual  error. There is ample experimental evidence in support of this view. 
Numerous neuropsychological studies have shown that visual shape perception 
may be pathologically dissociated from object recognition in consequence of severe 
brain damage. Thus subjects with associative visual agnosia may have profound 
deﬁ cits in abilities to recognize objects while retaining normal visual depth 
perception and normal visuomotor abilities ( Milner and Goodale, 1995/2006; 
Farah, 2001 ). This strongly suggests that stored knowledge about an object ’ s 
volumetric shape is not in general necessary in order to see the way the object ’ s 
visible surfaces are oriented in depth. 3 (Which, I should note, makes preeminently 
good sense from a  phylogenetic  standpoint: it seems highly likely that relatively low-
level, general-purpose strategies for recovering 3D surface layout from information 
in the light were phylogenetically in place prior to and, so, available to be exploited 
in the development of high-level abilities to recognize object-speciﬁ c, volumetric 
shapes. For discussion of this point, see  Millikan, 2004 , chap. 9.) 
 The enactive account, however, clearly seems to assimilate the problem of how 
we see an object ’ s 3D shape to the problem of how we recognize its volumetric 
shape across different possible views of the object. This is most evident when, in 
chapter three of  Action in Perception , Noë identiﬁ es an object ’ s sensorimotor proﬁ le 
with what Jan Koenderink and Andrea van Doorn call the object ’ s  ‘ visual potential ’ 
or  ‘ aspect graph ’ ( Koenderink and van Doorn, 1979; Koenderink, 1984 ). In the 
object recognition literature, an aspect graph is a  ‘ viewer-centric ’ representation 
of all topologically distinct, 2D views of an object in a network format ( Figure  1 ). 
 3  This is not to deny that that top-down, object-speciﬁ c knowledge may sometimes make 
contributions to lower-level visual processing that are not simply attentional in nature. See 
 Kosslyn, 1994 , 235-36 and  Kosslyn and Sussman, 1995 for evidence that such knowledge 
may prime lower-level visual processing mechanisms for perception of an object ’ s spatial 
features via mental imagery. See  Gregory, 1997 , for evidence that stored knowledge about 
faces and illumination conditions may dramatically affect perceived depth. For a contrarian 
defense of the modularity of early vision, see  Pylyshyn, 2003 , chap. 4. 
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To each view of the object, or aspect, there corresponds a node in the network. 
Connections between nodes represent translations between adjacent views of the 
object in 3D viewpoint space and thus mirror the way the object ’ s aspect changes 
as the result of movement. The task of visual object recognition, on this approach, 
is to segment and match 2D views of an object to the appropriate, stored aspect 
graph. (For discussion, see  Bowyer and Dyer, 1991; Van Effelterre, 1994 ; and  Tarr 
and Kriegman, 2001 .) Noë ’ s claim that seeing a 3D object is a  ‘ two-step ’ process —
 beginning perception of the object ’ s 2D P-shape and ending with a set of 
expectations about how its 2D P-shape would vary with variation in one ’ s point 
of view — seems clearly to recapitulate the process of object recognition as depicted 
by Koenderink and van Doorn. 
 One well-known difﬁ culty with the aspect-graph-based approach to object 
recognition is that the number of distinct 2D views in the aspect graph for an 
ordinary, geometrically complex object may be quite large ( Kriegman and Ponce, 
1990; Shimshoni and Ponce, 1997 ).  Koenderink (1984) , for example, counts one 
view in the model of a globe, and 26 views in the model of a cube, but over 
100,000 views in the model of a sculpture by the artist Giambologna. The 
computational challenge of matching or  ‘ indexing ’ a given view to the model of 
an object comprising thousands of distinct views is formidable, especially if we 
  
 Figure  1  The aspect graph or  ‘ visual potential ’ of a tetrahedron. Nodes represent 2D aspects, while 
connections between nodes represent translations in 3D viewpoint space. (From  Koenderink and van 
Doorn, 1979 by kind permission of Springer-Verlag.) 
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don ’ t assume that we already know which of indeﬁ nitely many possible different 
objects we are seeing. Terminological changes — e.g.,  for  ‘ segmenting a 2D view of 
an object ’ ,  read  ‘ seeing its P-shape ’ ,  for  ‘ matching a 2D view of an object to a stored 
aspect graph ’ ,  read  ‘ exercising implicit knowledge of the object ’ s sensorimotor 
proﬁ le ’ — do nothing, of course, to lighten the computational load. 4 
 Whether human object recognition actually utilizes internal representations of 
solid shape that have the properties of aspect graphs can only be decided by 
experimental psychology. For this reason Koenderink is quite careful to hedge claims 
about the psychological reality of the theory:  ‘ It is up to visual psychophysics to 
determine the amount of structure actually sampled by human observers  … we can 
at most hope to ﬁ nd a very coarse-grained version of the visual potential  in the mind ’ 
(1984, p. 142). In the last twenty years, however, experimental evidence for the role 
of internal, aspect-graph-like structures in human object recognition has not been 
forthcoming. While aspect-graph-based modeling techniques have found application 
in computer vision and graphics, and while the methods Koenderink and van Doorn 
developed in order mathematically to represent the topological features that 
characterize unique object views have found application in research on human object 
recognition ( Tarr and Kriegman, 2001 ), a wide variety of computationally less 
intensive and psychologically more plausible paradigms are currently being explored. 
(For a survey of recent viewpoint-dependent and viewpoint-independent approaches, 
see  Tarr and Bülthoff, 1999 .) Noë ’ s pronouncement in the passage quoted above 
that our visual abilities are sophisticated enough to manage the mathematically 
complicated sensorimotor proﬁ les of  ‘ animal bodies, plants, and so forth ’ , thus is not 
merely an a priori conjecture, it is quite probably false on empirical grounds. 
 For present purposes, the main points are two. First, the enactive account 
mistakenly assimilates the problem of visual shape perception to the problem of 
volumetric object recognition, thereby eliding the cognitive requirements of a 
relatively bottom-up (i.e. input-driven) process with those of a top-down process 
involving stored, object-speciﬁ c knowledge. Second, the aspect-graph-based 
model of volumetric object recognition to which the enactive account assimilates 
visual shape perception is both computationally very expensive and, from the 
standpoint of current empirical research, psychologically unrealistic. 
 Although space does not allow adequate elaboration here, I would suggest that 
the mistake diagnosed above is actually symptomatic of a much more profound 
confusion about the constitutive role of  bodily action  in perception. According to 
Noë,  ‘ to be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on 
sensory stimulation ’ (2004, p. 1). This is plausibly the enactive account ’ s central 
constitutive claim. It epitomizes the account ’ s competence model or  ‘ task-level ’ 
analysis of spatial vision and, importantly, distinguishes the enactive account from 
 4  Noë would presumably be loath to characterize sensorimotor knowledge in such 
representationalist terms. I do not think, however, that it is possible to deﬂ ect the charge of 
what might be called  crypto-representationalism  by insistence on the  ‘ implicit ’ or  ‘ practical ’ 
character of the relevant knowledge. 
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numerous other action-oriented theories of visual perception. The problem is that 
the constitutive claim is false. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that in 
order to utilize spatial information in the light for purposes of skilful, spatially 
directed visuomotor action, biological visual systems need be able to predict or 
anticipate the way sensory stimulations, i.e. raw, unprocessed visual input, would 
vary with possible bodily movements. 
 The objection can be brought out initially by means of an example that  O ‘ Regan 
and Noë 2001 use to motivate their  ‘ sensorimotor contingency theory ’ of 
perception (a forerunner of the enactive account): 
 Consider a missile guidance system allowing a missile to home in on an enemy 
airplane  … . If the missile turns left, then the image of the target shifts to the 
right. If the missile slows down, the size of the image of the airplane decreases 
in a predictable way. The missile guidance system must adequately interpret 
and adapt to such changes in order to track the target airplane efﬁ ciently. In 
other words,  the missile guidance system is  ‘ tuned to ’ the sensorimotor contingencies 
that govern airplane tracking. It  ‘ knows all about ’ or  ‘ has mastery over ’ the possible 
input/output relationships that occur during airplane tracking  (2001, p. 943, my 
emphasis). 
 The intended implication is that biological seeing is also subserved by implicit 
knowledge or understanding of the way sensory input would vary as a function of 
possible motor outputs. (Thus,  ‘ according to the enactive approach, vision depends 
on one ’ s knowledge of the sensory effects of, say, eye movements, for example, 
movements of the eye to the right causes a shift to the left in the retinal image ’ (Noë 
2004, p. 25).) This is not, however, what the example would seem to show. 
Consider: Why is it plausible to suppose that the position of the airplane ’ s image in 
the missile ’ s sights represents or conveys information about the location of the 
airplane in missile-centric space? The answer, to a ﬁ rst approximation, is that the 
missile is able to make systematic use of the image in order to track and advance in 
ﬂ ight toward the target. To function in this way, however, the missile needn ’ t 
 ‘ know all about ’ the various possible input/output relations. It needn ’ t  ‘ know ’ , e.g., 
that following the rule < turn toward the left when the image is on the left>  will causally 
tend to bring it about that the image will move toward the right and, so, toward the 
middle of its sights. The missile needn ’ t represent — either implicitly or explicitly —
 the causal relationship between turning to the left on the output-side and  ‘ foveating ’ 
the image on the input-side. It is enough for the missile successfully to exploit the 
image and, so, to fulﬁ ll its intended purpose that the relevant causal relationships 
between inputs and outputs do, as a matter of empirical fact, reliably obtain. 
 What confers a certain spatial representational content on the image, then, is its 
role in enabling image-consuming systems in the missile to perform their intended 
function of guiding the missile towards the location of its target. To perform this 
function, however, the relevant systems needn ’ t have any expectations about how 
raw (unprocessed) image inputs would vary with different possible rocket engine 
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outputs. They need only  ‘ know ’ how to respond differentially to variations in the 
structure of the image. Similarly, what confers a certain spatial representational 
content on a pattern of retinal stimulation, or so I would argue, is its role in 
enabling stimulation-consuming systems in the living creature to initiate bodily 
movements targeted on or otherwise directed in relation to objects and surfaces in 
the distal, 3D environment. Variations in an object ’ s shape and egocentric location, 
e.g., lead to variations in the structure of retinal stimulation, which, in turn, lead 
to variations in the way a perceiver extends her arm, rotates her hand, and scales 
her grip in order to grasp the object. (For neuropsychological evidence that the 
human visual system directly encodes incoming visual information using an action-
oriented, egocentric spatial coding system, see  Milner and Goodale, 1995/2006; 
Rizzolatti  et al. , 1997; Andersen  et al. , 1997; Colby, 1998; Colby and Goldberg, 
1999; Graziano and Botvinick, 2002 ; and  Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003 . For 
philosophical accounts premised on this idea, see  Evans, 1982, 1985; Peacocke, 
1992 , chap. 3;  Brewer, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Clark, 1997; Grush, 1998, 2000; 
Gallagher, 2005 ; and  Briscoe, forthcoming .) Biological seeing, of course, subserves 
a variety of other important purposes besides environmentally responsive visuomotor 
action — its contents are both  ‘ directive ’ and  ‘ descriptive ’ ( Millikan, 1996, 2006 ) —
 but this is plausibly its primary, i.e. evolutionarily central, function. In order to 
perform this function, however, a biological visual system needn ’ t have any stored 
expectations or implicit knowledge about how raw sensory inputs would vary with 
different possible motor outputs. 5 It is enough that the relevant  ‘ laws of sensorimotor 
contingency ’ do, as a matter of empirical fact obtain. 6 But, if this is correct, then 
 5  This claim, I should note, is compatible with well-known evidence that the primate visual 
system exploits a  ‘ corollary discharge ’ of the saccade command signal (SCS), i.e. a copy of 
motor instructions to the eye, in a predictive manner. Single-cell and fMRI studies of spatial 
remapping show that neurons at various stages in visual-processing exploit a corollary 
discharge of the SCS in order anticipatorily to shift their receptive ﬁ eld locations in the 
direction of an impending eye movement microseconds before its initiation ( Colby  et al. , 
1995; Merriam  et al. , 2003; Merriam and Colby, 2005; Merriam  et al. , 2007 ). To simplify, a 
corollary discharge indicating an impending saccade 30° to the left in effect tells relevant 
neurons:  ‘ If you are now ﬁ ring in response to an item  x , then stop ﬁ ring at  x . If there is now 
an item  y  in the region of oculocentric visual space that would be coincident with your 
receptive ﬁ eld after a saccade 30° to the left, then start ﬁ ring at  y ’ . Such putative remapping 
responses are strongest in parietal cortex and at higher levels in visual processing (V3A and 
hV4) and weakest at lower levels (V1 and V2). Further details needn ’ t concern us here. For 
present purposes, the main point is that spatial remapping is a mechanism by means of which 
the visual system is able to create and maintain continuously up-to-date representations of 
distal, oculocentric object and feature locations. Hence, to the extent that remapping is 
properly regarded as predictive, the relevant predictions are to be understood at the level of 
 representational content , i.e. changes in distal object and feature locations relative to the eye, not 
at the level of  representational vehicle , i.e. correlative changes in proximal retinal stimulation. 
These remarks need to be developed with greater care than is possible here, but for relevant 
discussion of the proximal-distal distinction in the psychology of spatial vision, see  Burge, 
1986 , pp. 24-39 and  Millikan, 2004 , chap. 7. 
 6  In this respect, they are akin to reliable environmental properties upon which evolved 
biological systems can  ‘ piggyback ’ or use as  ‘ external scaffolding ’ ( Clark, 1997, chap. 2 ). 
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the enactive account seriously over-intellectualizes perception. It falsely elevates a 
causal, background condition of the possibility of spatially contentful visual 
experience to the level of knowledge required by the subject in order to enjoy 
such experience. 
 Noë, I should note, has responded to this charge.  ‘ The charge of 
overintellectualizing ’ , he writes,  ‘ is  … answered, in two distinct ways. First, 
sensorimotor knowledge is knowledge of the way sensory stimulation varies as we 
move; it is knowledge that we share with non-linguistic creatures. Second, 
sensorimotor knowledge gets brought to bear in experience not in the form of 
judgment or belief or representation construction. The knowledge is practical, and 
we use it to gain and maintain contact with the world ’ (forthcoming, ms. p. 47). 
It seems clear, however, that neither answer actually addresses the gravamen of the 
case made here against the enactive account. The problem is not that the enactive 
account, so to speak, unwarrantedly  ‘ conceptualizes ’ sensorimotor knowledge. 
The problem is rather that sensorimotor knowledge in the speciﬁ c sense that Noë 
intends, i.e. knowledge of the way  proximal ,  physicalistically characterizable sensory 
stimulation  would vary with actual and possible bodily movements, is unnecessary 
to gain and maintain perceptual contact with the world. 
 Andy Clark has argued that any biologically plausible model in cognitive 
theorizing must comport with what he calls the  ‘ 007 principle ’ : 
 In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in 
costly ways when they can use the structure of the environment and their 
operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-processing 
operations concerned. That is, know only as much as you need to know to get 
the job done ( 1989 , p. 64). 
 In view of the foregoing discussion, it seems pretty clear that the enactive account 
violates the 007 principle. It stores in the modeled head what nature leaves to the 
world, namely, the  ‘ laws of sensorimotor contingency ’ . Here are two more 
reasons to think that the enactive account violates Clark ’ s constraint. The ﬁ rst 
has do to with what Mark  Wexler (2004) calls  sensory aliasing :  ‘ Most of the time, 
current sensory states and motor commands can lead to many (usually inﬁ nitely 
many) future sensory states ’ (2004, p. 422). Moving sideways to the left while 
facing a solid object, e.g. not only leads to a corresponding shift of the retinal 
image to the right, but also to a deformation in the image that in general can 
only be predicted if one already knows the object ’ s volumetric, 3D shape. More 
generally, the point is that it is normally impossible to predict or emulate changes 
in unprocessed visual stimulation on the basis of the motor output signal without 
assuming unrealistically detailed and complete knowledge of the spatial structure 
of the environment — not to mention the impending movements of other agents 
and objects, illumination conditions, etc. (See  Wiener and Raab, 2004 for related 
discussion.) If this right, however, then the worry is that the enactive account 
implicitly makes cognitive demands on the perceiver the satisfaction of which 
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would, for all intents and purposes, make actually  seeing  the environment 
unnecessary. 7 
 Another reason to think that the enactive account violates the 007 Principle has 
to do with the role of conscious visual awareness in visuomotor action. According 
to  Hurley and Noë, forthcoming : 
 … it looks as if [an approaching] ball can be avoided by ducking because it 
looks as if ducking would make the situation look different in certain ways. 
Thus, when a ball looks as if it is moving towards one ’ s face, it looks as if 
ducking would make the situation look different; as a result, it looks as if 
ducking would avoid the ball, and thus ducking to avoid the ball is enabled ’ 
(ms. p. 5). 
 This view does not have much prima facie plausibility. In particular, such 
anticipatory knowledge of the sensory effects of movements as is posited by Hurley 
and Noë seems neither necessary, nor sufﬁ cient for environmentally adaptive, real-
time visuomotor action. It seems unnecessary, ﬁ rst, because there is abundant 
evidence that successful visuomotor action is possible without conscious visual 
awareness ( Milner and Goodale, 1995/2006; Clark, 2001; Gazzaniga, 1998; Koch, 
2004 , chaps. 12 and 13) and, so, without knowledge of how an object or situation 
would  look  or  appear  different were one to move in certain ways. Well-known 
ﬁ ndings concerning subjects with profound visual form agnosia, e.g. show that 
rapid and ﬂ uent visually guided reaching, grasping, locomotion, etc., can be 
sustained despite pathological loss of normal abilities consciously to see the spatial 
properties of surrounding objects. Indeed, the possibility of such adaptive, visually 
guided in the absence of conscious visual awareness makes good sense from a 
phylogenetic perspective. As Gareth Evans writes,  ‘ it seems abundantly clear that 
the evolution could throw up an organism in which  … advantageous links [between 
sensory input and behavioral output] were established long before it had provided 
us with a conscious subject of experience ’ (1985, p. 387). But, if this is the case, 
then there is thus something fundamentally amiss with the suggestion that one ’ s 
ability to avoid an incoming baseball is connected with knowledge concerning the 
way avoiding the baseball would make the situation  look  different. In general, 
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies (understood here as regularities in the 
way  ‘ looks ’ or  ‘ visual appearances ’ undergo transformation with variation in one ’ s 
point of view) would not seem to be necessary for visually guided action targeted 
on or otherwise directed in relation to an object. 
 It also seems clear that having such knowledge would not be  sufﬁ cient . In 
particular, having such knowledge would not seem to explain or otherwise account 
for what Sean  Kelly (2004) describes as our  ‘ bodily readiness ’ to deal with an 
 7  Hence, it strikingly fails to follow through on the idea, notably endorsed by Noë himself, 
that perceptual systems can ofﬂ oad sensory processing by treating the world as  ‘ its own best 
model ’ ( Brooks, 1991 ) or as an  ‘ external memory ’ ( O ’ Regan, 1992 ). 
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object ’ s perceived features. It is hardly clear, e.g., how knowledge concerning the 
way a teapot ’ s  ‘ look ’ , i.e. its 2D perspectival shape and size, would vary with 
possible bodily movements might plausibly be supposed to enable one accurately 
to reach toward the teapot ’ s handle, let alone to scale and adjust one ’ s grip to its 
3D shape and orientation. As Stephen Palmer (in criticism of the aspect graph 
approach) writes,  ‘ Just from looking at an object, we generally feel that we know 
a great deal about its 3D structure, including how to shape our hands to grasp it 
and what it would feel like if we were to explore it manually. How can all this 
occur if all we have access to is structured set of 2D views? ’ (1999, p. 451). Noë 
often calls attention to similarities between seeing and touching an object — indeed 
he says that we ought to make touch our paradigm for perception — but, strikingly, 
the enactive account omits to provide any account of how seeing an object actually 
enables us to handle or otherwise interact with it. ( ‘ Visuomotor control ’ is not 
even in the index to  Action in Perception !) In this respect and in notable contrast 
with other inﬂ uential action-oriented theories of visual perception — for an 
overview, see  Mandik, 2005 — the enactive account is decidedly  inactive . 8 
 3. Coin Tricks: Against the Phenomenological Claim 
 A traditional criticism of the sense-datum approach is that it makes an illicit inference 
from the  phenomenological  claim that a coin, when viewed from an angle, appears 
elliptical to the  perceptual  claim that this is the case because the subject  sees  something 
that actually is elliptical.  Chisholm (1957) calls this the  ‘ sense-datum fallacy ’ . (Also 
see  Sellars, 1968 .) Notably, this criticism targets the sense-datum theorist ’ s 
interpretation of the phenomenological claim, but leaves the claim itself intact. 
 A more recent line of criticism due to Sean  Kelly (2004) also concedes the 
phenomenological claim, but seeks to delimit its application. According to Kelly, 
it is possible to assume a certain behaviorally disengaged or detached perceptual 
attitude in which a tilted coin really does look elliptical. However, this is not the 
subject ’ s normal  ‘ engaged ’ attitude. In the engaged attitude, the subject perceives 
the coin as round. (This is shown  inter alia  by how she acts in respect of the coin.) 
For Kelly, the engaged attitude is primary. Hence, it is a mistake to explain what 
we see when we are in the engaged attitude in terms of what we see when we are 
in the disengaged attitude. 
 (In his  ‘ Real Presence ’ , Noë offers in response to Kelly that  ‘ When I focus my 
attention on the coin ’ s shape, the elliptical appearance property that would be 
available to me as the focus of my attention were I to shift to the detached attitude, 
 8  I should emphasize at this juncture that I think that Noë ’ s heart is philosophically in the right 
place. I fully agree with him that perceiving is a skilful, bodily activity involving the animal 
as a whole and that we cannot hope adequately to understand perceptual representational 
content if we do not keep this in mind (see  Briscoe forthcoming ). At a lower level of 
generality, however, there is obviously much less about which we are in agreement. 
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is present in experience only as a feature of the background. If this is right, then 
the opposition between engaged and detached attitudes is just a symptom of the 
ﬁ gure/ground structure of conscious attention ’ [forthcoming, ms. p. 11]. Noë ’ s 
appeal to the ﬁ gure/ground distinction from Gestalt theory seems far-fetched, 
however, since the putative shift of attention occurs  within  the region of the visual 
ﬁ eld bounded by the coin ’ s occluding edges, and, so, does not involve the coin ’ s 
relation to its background or the surrounding scene.) 9 
 A substantially less accommodating line of criticism, carefully elaborated by 
Charles  Siewert (1998) and A. D.  Smith (2000a, 2000b) , targets the sense-datum 
theorist ’ s phenomenological claim, i.e. the claim that an object ’ s visually apparent 
shape is the shape of its perspective projection on the frontal plane. When we view 
the tilted coin, we see — in the most natural and straightforward sense of seeing —
 what looks like a disk that is partly nearer and partly farther away from us. We don ’ t 
see something that looks (in either an epistemic or non-epistemic sense of  ‘ looks ’ ) 
like a ﬂ at, upright ellipse. 10 In general, the apparent shapes of the objects we see are 
shapes in depth. Thus, as Siewert nicely puts it, if there are any visual sense-data, 
then  ‘ we will have to puff them out to three-dimensions ’ (1998, p. 227). 
 Ample empirical support for this objection is afforded by recent work in vision 
science. Indeed, the dominant  ‘ information-processing ’ view in vision science is 
premised on the assumption that, to quote A.D. Smith,  ‘ pre-conscious processes 
can extract 3D information from what is given to the eye, and can issue, as their 
 ﬁ rst  conscious upshot, in phenomenally 3D visual experience ’ (2000b, p. 492). 
Detailed discussion of the information-processing view is obviously impossible 
here, but key points to be made below can be motivated, I hope, by means of a 
few brief examples. 
First, consider the role played by reﬂ ections in 3D shape perception. Recent 
psychophysical research has shown that, under real-world illumination conditions, 
reﬂ ections are a reliable source of information about surface curvature and texture 
( Takeuchi and Matsuoka, 2002; Fleming  et al. , 2003; Fleming  et al. , 2004 ). In fact, 
 9  In fact, Noë ’ s position on the relation between visual attention and visual awareness is quite 
ambiguous.  ‘ There is a sense ’ , he writes,  ‘ … in which we move about in a sea of perspectival 
properties and we are aware of them (usually without thought or notice) whenever we are 
perceptually conscious. Indeed, to be perceptually conscious is to be aware of them ’ (2004, 
p. 167). The problem is that this claim seems ﬂ atly to conﬂ ict with empirical ﬁ ndings 
concerning the phenomenon known as  ‘ change blindness ’ . These ﬁ ndings strongly support 
the view that which details in a scene are consciously perceived — and so which can change 
without notice — is a function of visual attention. (For a review, see  Simons and Rensink, 
2005a, 2005b ). Noë, it should be emphasized, accepts this conclusion.  ‘ In general ’ , he writes, 
 ‘ you only see that to which you attend. If something occurs outside the scope of attention, 
even if it ’ s perfectly visible (i.e. unobstructed, central, large), you won ’ t see it ’ (2004, p. 52). 
Indeed, studies of change blindness play a prominent role in motivating his  ‘ anti-
representationalism ’ about visual perception ( O ’ Regan and Noë, 2001 ;  Noë, forthcoming ). 
It seems clear, however, that Noë cannot have it both ways: he cannot maintain both that 
you are visually aware of P-properties even when you are not attending to them  and  that 
 ‘ you only see that to which you attend ’ . 
 10  See  Austin 1962 , p. 28 for a similar objection. 
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reﬂ ections  alone  sometimes sufﬁ ce to convey a vivid impression of 3D shape. 
Consider Figure 2 adapted from  Fleming, 2004 . In the ﬁ gure, we see four objects 
with identical silhouettes (P-shapes), but dramatically different apparent 3D shapes. 
Note that the image of the silhouette by itself on the upper left seems ﬂ at or 2D. 
Also note that when viewing the mirrored surfaces in the other three images the 
only information about 3D shape is provided by  reﬂ ections  of the surrounding 
environment: the images contain no motion, texture, shading, etc. The key insight 
is that, under normal illumination conditions, i.e. the sorts of terrestrial illumination 
conditions in which the human visual system evolved, reﬂ ections on an object ’ s 
surface are distorted in a way that systematically and measurably depends on the way 
the object ’ s surfaces are oriented in depth ( ‘ shape-from-specularities ’ ). These 
distortions appear as continuously varying, texture-like patterns, which Fleming 
  
 Figure  2  Four images with identical silhouettes (P-shapes), but dramatically different apparent 3D 
shapes. Observers typically report having a vivid impression of 3D shape when viewing the three mir-
rored surfaces, even though the images contain no motion, stereo, texture, or shading. (From  Fleming, 
2004 by kind permission of the author.) 
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and his colleagues call  ‘ orientation ﬁ elds ’ . They argue that the visual system can 
recover strong constraints on 3D shape from the orientation ﬁ elds on a reﬂ ecting 
surface, much as it can recover strong constraints on 3D shape from the way 
texture patterns are compressed on a textured surface. An example of such  ‘ shape-
from-texture ’ is provided in  Figure  3 . In the  ﬁ gure , we see a uniformly textured, 
planar surface slanted at 30°, 60°, and 80° in depth. When the textured surface is 
rotated away from the frontal plane, the texture elements in the image are visibly 
compressed due to foreshortening. Such texture compression is often diagnostic 
of an object ’ s 3D shape.
 Other  ‘ cues ’ to depth include occlusion (see §§5-6 below), motion parallax 
(relative motion), and shading. (For a more complete review and discussion, see 
 Palmer, 1999 and  Bruce  et al. , 2003 .) Perhaps the most important and widely studied 
source of depth information, however, comes from binocular disparity (stereopsis). 11 
Binocular disparity arises due to small positional differences or  ‘ disparities ’ between 
corresponding features in the two retinal images caused by the horizontal separation 
of the eyes. These disparities are used by the visual system to determine the relative 
depth between visible surfaces as well as their orientation (slant). A powerful example 
of the difference made by binocular disparity to our visual experience of the 3D 
world is provided by the neurobiologist Sue Barry. After living for decades without 
stereovision due to a congenital eye disorder, Barry underwent corrective therapy 
involving special eyeglasses. The results were dramatic. Here are two excerpts from 
her diary recently published by Oliver Sacks: 
 February 22: I noticed the edge of the open door to my ofﬁ ce seemed to stick 
out toward me. Now, I always knew that the door was sticking out toward me 
when it was open because of the shape of the door, perspective and other 
monocular cues, but I had never seen it in depth. It made me do a double take 
and look at it with one eye and then the other in order to convince myself that 
it looked different. It was deﬁ nitely out there. 
  
 Figure  3  A planar surface slanted at 30°, 60°, and 80° in depth. (From  Fleming, 2004 by kind 
permission of the author.) 
 11  See  Howard and Rogers, 1995 and  Schor, 2004 . 
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 March 4: While I was running this morning with the dog, I noticed that the 
bushes looked different. Every leaf seemed to stand out in its own little 3D 
space. The leaves didn ’ t just overlap with each other as I used to see them. I could 
see the SPACE between the leaves. The same is true for twigs on trees, pebbles 
on the road, stones in a stone wall. Everything has more texture ( Sacks, 2006 ). 
 These diary entries vividly attest to the dramatic inﬂ uence of binocular depth 
information on the spatial phenomenal character of our visual experience. Indeed, 
this is why  trompe l ’ oeil  paintings are traditionally supposed to be viewed with one 
eye shut. The visual illusion of three-dimensionality created by pictorial depth cues 
in the paintings is much enhanced when they are not in competition with the 
verdicts of stereovision. 
 For present purposes, there are two important points to take away from these 
familiar examples: First, there is ample empirical evidence for the view that an 
object ’ s 3D shape is adequately speciﬁ ed by information in the light reﬂ ected from 
the object ’ s visible surfaces and transduced by the eyes. Second, such shape-
diagnostic information, having once been processed by the visual system, is not lost 
in our conscious visual experience of the object. Indeed, the examples above show 
that we can literally see difference made by their presence (and absence) in the 
light available to the eyes. 12 A coin ’ s orientation in depth is as much part of the 
coin ’ s visual appearance — how the coin looks when viewed  from here , as Noë puts 
it — as is its color or texture (a point nicely articulated in  Siewert, 2006 ). It is 
important to emphasize that a more complete review of evidence for this view 
would require not only detailed explanation of the mechanisms by means of which 
the visual system utilizes individual sources of depth information, but also discussion 
of the way the visual system integrates or  ‘ averages ’ simultaneously available and 
sometimes mutually inconsistent sources of depth information. (For an overview, 
see  Cutting and Vishton, 1995 and  Bruce  et al. , 2003 , chap. 7.) 
 12  Perhaps Noë would reply that such  ‘ mainstream ’ theorizing in cognitive science about how 
binocular disparity and other sources of depth-speciﬁ c information are exploited by the visual 
system is ﬁ ne so far as it goes, but it does not tell us anything, constitutively speaking, about 
 what it is  to see an object ’ s spatial properties at the level of perceiver-environment interaction. 
 ‘ No doubt perception depends on what takes place in the brain ’ , he writes,  ‘ and very likely 
there are internal representations in the brain (e.g. content-bearing internal states). What 
perception is, however, is not a process in the brain but a kind of skilful activity on the part 
of the animal as a whole ’ (2004, 2). It is important to see, however, that such a reply would 
in no way serve to motivate the  speciﬁ c  constitutive claim on which the enactive account is 
premised, i.e. the claim that in order to perceive an object ’ s spatial properties it is necessary 
to understand how sensory stimulations caused by the object would vary with possible bodily 
movements. It is hard to see that such understanding plays any fundamental role in enabling 
skilful, visually based activity on the part of the animal as a whole if spatial information 
adequate for purposes of engaging in such activity is not only already available to the animal 
in the structure of the light reﬂ ected by the object, but is also demonstrably exploited by the 
animal ’ s visual system. 
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 We are now in a position to comment on Noë ’ s recent claims about the 
perception of 3D shape in  ‘ Real Presence ’ . Noë writes: 
 … what explains the fact that normal adult perceivers feel no inclination to 
take [a coin presented at an angle] to be elliptical on the basis of its visual 
appearance is the fact that they do have an abundance of countervailing 
information. Most of us know that coins are round, and we know that round, 
ﬂ at things change their perspectival shape as our spatial relation to them varies. 
As a matter of fact, there is considerable evidence that genuinely naïve 
perceivers — perceivers truly lacking the relevant countervailing information —
 would take round coins presented at an angle to be elliptical. Cheselden  … 
describes the astonishment of a young boy who had undergone cataract surgery 
at the way a coin changed its shape as it moved; Helmholtz describes a similar 
case of a boy astonished at the changing shape of a locket (Noë, forthcoming, 
ms. p. 5). 13 
 Noë is surely correct to say that the reason that normal perceivers feel no inclination 
to take the coin to be elliptical on the basis of its visual appearance is that they have 
abundant  countervailing information . The problem is that he seriously misrepresents 
both the character of that information and the normal perceiver ’ s epistemic 
situation in visual perception. A normal perceiver does not see that the coin is 
round because she knows  ‘ that coins are round, and … that round, ﬂ at things 
change their perspectival shape as our spatial relation to them varies ’ . Rather, we 
have seen that, under normal, informationally good viewing conditions, the coin ’ s 
3D shape and orientation are adequately speciﬁ ed by the structure of the light 
available as input to the visual system, i.e. such information as is provided by 
binocular disparity, reﬂ ections, shading, etc. The point is that the enactive 
account — in prescinding from the  ‘ bottom-up ’ contributions made to visual 
experience by such spatial information and by adverting instead to  ‘ top-down ’ 
expectations about the sensory effects of movement — falsiﬁ es the phenomenological 
facts. A normal perceiver does not take a coin presented at angle to be round 
because she knows better than to take it to be elliptical. Elliptical simply is not in 
the running as a candidate for the coin ’ s apparent shape. 
 (Hence, the perceiver ’ s  expectations  with regard to what she would see were she 
to move in relation to the coin, to the extent that she has such expectations, are 
quite different than her expectations with regard to what she would see were she 
to move in relation to an upright ellipse. But the reason isn ’ t, as Noë maintains, 
that the differences between the relevant sets of sensorimotor expectations are in 
 13  Noë misremembers the details of the two cases he mentions here. It is Helmholtz who in his 
 Physiological Optics  (1909/1925) remarks on a patient ’ s surprise at the way a coin appears to 
change shape when rotated and  Cheselden (1728/1971) who describes a young boy ’ s 
astonishment that his father ’ s likeness should ﬁ t within the conﬁ nes of his mother ’ s locket. 
© 2008 The Author
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive   475 
some sense constitutive of the difference between her perceptual experiences in 
the two cases. It is just the other way around. Her sensorimotor expectations are 
different because what she  sees  is different.) 14 
 Let us now turn to the claim that  ‘ genuinely naïve perceivers  … would take 
round coins presented at an angle to be elliptical ’ . In support of this claim, Noë 
adverts to the Cheselden case of 1728, a mainstay of philosophical reﬂ ection on 
what has come to be known as  ‘ Molyneux ’ s Question ’ . (In a letter sent to John 
Locke in 1688, the Dublin lawyer William Molyneux asked whether a blind man 
educated by touch to discriminate the shapes of 3D objects would visually recognize 
their shapes upon being gifted with sight.) There are good reasons, however, to be 
skeptical about phenomenological claims made on the basis of evidence about the 
post-operative experiences of cataract patients in the 18 th century. As A. D. Smith 
has pointed out, excising cataracts at the time involved  ‘ the complete removal or 
displacement of the lens of the eye ’ (2000b, p. 496). Hence, the post-operative 
experiences of patients would presumably reﬂ ect serious physical impairment of 
the visual organ. To make matters worse, the prolonged sensory deprivation 
suffered by the hitherto blind patients would, in all likelihood, have caused 
irremediable, neurally based perceptual deﬁ cits. David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel, 
e.g. in well-known animal studies showed that, when binocular vision is averted 
by a congenital defect or by surgical intervention, binocular cells in the visual 
cortex fail to develop ( Hubel and Wiesel, 1963; Wiesel, 1982 ). In consequence of 
such developmental brain damage, the functioning of later vision, as Shaun 
Gallagher comments,  ‘ will be limited and quite different, not only from the normal 
adult, but also from the newborn infant. In neurophysiological terms, the neonate 
is not equivalent to the Molyneux patient ’ (2005, p. 166). 
 The upshot is that there is little reason to suppose that the reports about the 
post-operative experiences of cataract patients tell us anything about  ‘ genuinely 
naïve ’ perception. Indeed, contemporary medical studies suggest that what patients 
ﬁ rst  ‘ see ’ after cataract surgery is not an array of 2D forms, but rather a meaningless 
blur of lights and colors ( Gregory and Wallace, 1963; Sacks, 1995 ). (Noë, I should 
note, is forgetful that he himself once observed that cataract surgery on the 
congenitally blind  ‘ does not in fact restore sight. In none of the well-known cases, 
from the famous Cheseldon [ sic ] case down to the present day, does surgery result 
in vision ’ ( Noë, 2002 , p. 68).) Moreover, if it can be assumed that neonates and 
very young infants  are  genuinely naïve perceivers, then, as  Smith 2000b and 
 Gallagher 2005 convincingly argue, there is fairly persuasive developmental 
evidence that the intrinsic or  ‘ original ’ spatial phenomenal character of visual 
 14  Compare Merleau-Ponty:  ‘ What, then,  …  is  seeing a cube? It is, say empiricists, associating 
with the actual aspect of the drawing presented, a set of other appearances, those that it 
would present at closer quarters, from the side, from various angles. But, when I see a cube, 
I do not ﬁ nd any of these images in myself; they are the small change of a perception of depth 
which makes them possible, but which does not result from them ’ ( 1945/1962 , p. 264). 
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experience is 3D. From ﬁ rst perception, human beings experience objects as 
arrayed in 3D space. 
 Some of the main ﬁ ndings about the visual abilities of neonates and very 
young infants, based on standard preferential looking measures, include the 
following: 
 1.  Neonates visually perceive  shape  as invariant across changes in retinal 
stimulation caused by changes in object orientation, i.e. shape constancy is 
present at birth. There is evidence both that neonates detect and respond 
to changes in an object ’ s slant in depth, and also that they respond to an 
object ’ s real shape, regardless of its slant ( Slater and Morison, 1985 ). 
 2.  Neonates visually perceive  size  as invariant across changes in retinal 
stimulation caused by changes in object location, i.e. size constancy is 
present at birth. Thus, in one experiment, neonates differentiated between 
the size of a large cube and a less distant small cube despite the similarity 
of their retinal sizes ( Slater  et al. , 1990 ). 
 3.  Neonates selectively ﬁ xate a 3D stimulus in preference to a photograph of 
the same stimulus, even under monocular viewing conditions and even 
when the major depth cue is motion parallax ( Slater  et al. , 1984 ). 
 4.  Infants as young as eight weeks perceive 3D object shape when shown 
kinetic random-dot displays ( Arterberry and Yonas, 2000 ). 
 Weighing similar evidence about neonatal visual abilities, Smith draws the 
following conclusion:  ‘ the idea that sight must acquire a 3D signiﬁ cance has a 
probability of approximately zero  … . Indeed, in the absence of both argument 
and developmental perspective it is difﬁ cult even to  make sense  of the claim that 
three-dimensionality is not  ‘ original ’ to sight ’ (2000b, pp. 502-3). 15 If this is right, 
however, then there is simply no empirical substance to Noë ’ s claim that  ‘ genuinely 
naïve ’ perceivers would visually experience a round coin presented at an angle as 
elliptical. 
 4. Noticing P-Properties as Make-Perceive 
 We have seen that the real objection to the phenomenological claim is not, as Sean 
 Kelly (2004) suggests, that in order to see the elliptical  ‘ look ’ of a coin presented at 
an angle we must adopt a certain detached perceptual attitude. This objection, it is 
now clear, concedes far too much. The coin does have an elliptical P-shape — this 
we know from the laws of linear perspective — but the coin looks round 
 15  This is not to deny, of course, that human neonatal visual abilities are quite limited in 
comparison with those of more mature perceivers. There is evidence, e.g. that stereopsis, for 
example, becomes fully operative only around the end of the fourth month of life ( Atkinson 
and Braddick, 1989 ). 
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(and slanted in depth). The real objection to the phenomenological claim, we have 
seen, is that the coin simply does not have an elliptical  ‘ look ’ . 
 What about the phenomenologically weaker claim that, in seeing the coin, we are 
 able to see  its elliptical P-shape? After all, even if an object ’ s visually apparent shape is 
fully 3D, might it not be the case that we also see its 2D P-shape? The enactive 
account, of course, is premised on this supposition.  ‘ P-properties ’ , Noë writes,  ‘ are 
themselves  objects of sight , that is, things that we see. They are visible ’ (2004, p. 83). 
And also:  ‘ The crux is that P-properties are not merely visible qualities, such as shape 
and size. They are  looks  of things, their visual appearances ’ (2004, p. 84). 
 The burden of this section will be to show that this supposition is mistaken. 
When we see an object under standard perceptual circumstances, we see its visually 
apparent 3D shape, i.e. the orientation of its visible surfaces in depth, but we do 
not also see its 2D P-shape. In general, P-shapes are not properties that 3D objects 
under standard perceptual circumstances can literally be seen to instance. (This, 
however, as I point out below, is not to deny that P-shapes are sometimes visible 
when we see certain pictorial representations of objects.) 
 Perhaps the most straightforward objection to the claim that in seeing an object 
we are able to see the shape of the patch that would occlude the object on a plane 
perpendicular to the line of sight is that both the plane and the patch are 
hypothetical, i.e. counterfactual. Presuming that we do not in any literal sense 
perceive hypothetical objects (we do not  inter alia stand in any causal relation to 
them), and that we do not see properties without seeing the objects that appear to 
instance them (there are no  ‘ disembodied ’ properties), it follows that we do not see 
an object ’ s P-shape. We no more see the shape of the patch that  would  occlude a 
coin on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight when viewing the coin, than 
when viewing the sky at night we see the lines that  would  connect the stars in 
Orion ’ s belt. 
 J. J.  Gibson (1966, 1979) provides another objection to the claim that we are 
able to see an object ’ s P-shape: 
 What one becomes aware of by holding still, closing one eye, and observing a 
frozen scene are not visual sensations but only  the surfaces of the world that are viewed 
now from here . They are not ﬂ at or depthless but simply unhidden (1979, p. 286). 
 Drawing in perspective does depend on viewing in perspective, it is true, but 
this only means that drawing requires the learner to notice the edges of the 
layout confronting him, especially the occluding edges … . What we loosely call 
an outline in a picture refers to the outer edges of the face of an object  … . I am 
saying that edge perspective is a fact, whereas patchwork perspective is a myth. 
One can learn to view the former but not to see the latter (1979, p. 287). 
 Gibson ’ s point in these passages, I take it, is that an object ’ s occluding edges are 
perceptibly oriented  in depth :  ‘ the surfaces inside the ﬁ eld of view  … are not a 
depthless patchwork of colors, for they have the quality that I [call] slant ’ (1979, 
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p. 196). If this is right, then to attend to an object ’ s occluding edges, to limn them 
with the line of sight, so to speak, is not in itself to see its P-shape. The occluding 
edges of the objects we see, in contrast with the contours of their P-shapes, are 
oriented in 3D space. This objection to what Gibson calls  ‘ patchwork perspective ’ , 
incidentally, bears on Noë ’ s proposal that  ‘ the plate looks elliptical to me because, 
to indicate its shape, I can (and indeed, in some sense,  must ) move my hand in a 
characteristic manner. That is, to experience a thing as elliptical is precisely to 
experience it as occupying a particular kind of region in one ’ s egocentric, 
sensorimotor space ’ (2004, p. 89). The problem with this proposal, we are now in 
a position to see, is its assumption that what I succeed in indicating when I move 
my hand in an ellipse is the plate ’ s 2D P-shape on the frontal plane and not simply 
the plate ’ s occluding edges in 3D space. 
 I have been providing reasons to resist the claim that when we are presented 
with a 3D object under standard perceptual circumstances we are able to see its 
P-shape. This, however, is not to deny that we are able to see an object ’ s 
P-shape in a perspectivally accurate picture or photograph. Indeed, Richard 
Wollheim has argued that it is essential to our visual experience of a pictorial 
representation that it comprise both a  ‘ recognitional ’ and a  ‘ conﬁ gurational ’ 
aspect ( 1980, 1998 ). In seeing a pictorial representation, we visually recognize 
what is pictured in seeing the physical conﬁ guration of the pictorial surface. 
Wollheim calls this phenomenon  ‘ seeing in ’ (in deliberate contrast with  ‘ seeing 
as ’ ). Thus we may see the 3D shape of a cat  in  the 2D patch of photo-pigment 
corresponding to the cat on the surface of a photograph. It is a necessary feature 
of  ‘ representational seeing ’ , of the seeing appropriate to the perception of a 
picture  as  a picture, that we be able to attend both to the object represented by 
the picture and to the physical medium/vehicle of representation. Wollheim 
refers to this requirement as the  ‘ two-fold thesis ’ . 
 In  Action in Perception,  Noë suggests that Wollheim ’ s analysis of representational 
seeing can be extended in order to explain straightforward perception of 3D spatial 
properties:  ‘ Just as it is the case that you see a picture, and, in seeing the picture, 
you see what the picture depicts  … , so I want to suggest that we see the elliptical 
perspectival properties [of a plate] and, in seeing them, we see the plate ’ s circularity 
(and so in that sense see the circularity in the elliptical perspectival properties) ’ 
(2004, p. 241, n. 8). The trouble, if the foregoing discussion is correct, is that there 
is nothing plausibly analogous in the world to a 2D pictorial surface — or to a 2D 
patch of photo-pigment or paint — in straightforward perception of a round plate. 
In seeing the plate, the conﬁ gurational aspect of what Wollheim calls representational 
seeing is missing from our experience. Hence, the notion of  ‘ seeing in ’ does not 
ﬁ nd legitimate application. 
 Noë works hard to motivate the claim that P-shapes are properties that 3D 
objects, and not just pictures of 3D objects, can literally be seen to instance. I think 
that our phenomenological intuitions, however, are easily distorted by reﬂ ection 
on the sorts of examples favored by Noë and by sense-datum theorists in general. 
The reason is that it is easy to notice — in a sense that I shall presently explain — the 
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simple and regular P-shape of a coin, or a tabletop, or a globe, while it is exceedingly 
difﬁ cult to notice the intricate and irregular P-shape of an oak tree, or a rose bush, 
or an abstract sculpture by Frank Stella. I want to claim that noticing the P-shape 
of a coin, to take the simplest case, is so easy, in fact, that we mistake the act of 
noticing its P-shape for the act of  seeing  its P-shape. Having made this mistake, we 
then suppose that there is such a thing in general as  ‘ seeing an object ’ s P-shape ’ . 
And once our phenomenological intuitions are distorted in this way, it is then 
possible for us to take seriously the suggestion that being able to see an object ’ s 3D 
shape in some sense depends on being able to see its 2D P-shape. 
 What, then, do I mean by  ‘ noticing ’ an object ’ s P-shape? I can begin by 
explaining what I  don ’ t  mean. I don ’ t mean making the visually based judgment (or 
forming the visually based belief) that the object would project a certain 2D shape 
on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. Noticing that a coin viewed from an 
angle has an elliptical P-shape is not like noticing that Alice ’ s dress is new because 
the price tag is still on it. My — admittedly speculative — proposal is rather the 
following: Noticing an object ’ s P-shape involves  an exercise of visual imagination 
guided by seeing , an act of what one might call  ‘ make-perceive ’ . In general, one 
engages in make-perceive when one projects or  ‘ superimposes ’ a mental image on 
a certain region of the visually perceived world. Thus, as Rick Grush observes, one 
might use a mental image to decide where in egocentric space a vase should be 
placed in order best to obscure a picture on the desk ( 2004 , p. 390). Similarly, 
when deciding how to arrange the furniture in a new home, one might begin by 
visualizing how things would look were one to place an armchair in a certain 
empty corner, or were one to hang a painting on a certain unadorned wall. It 
seems clear that one does not in any literal sense  see  the visualized armchair in the 
empty corner or the visualized painting on the wall. Perhaps the best and most 
familiar example of make-perceive is the experience of noticing a constellation in 
the night-time sky. Noticing a constellation is a hybrid visual-imaginative 
experience: it involves both  seeing the stars in the constellation and  imagining the 
lines that connect them at the same time. 16  Gosselin and Schyns (2002) call such 
hybrid experiences involving both top-down, internally generated and bottom-up, 
externally generated components  ‘ superstitious perception ’. 
 To notice an object ’ s P-shape, I now want to claim, is to make-perceive its 
P-shape. It is — knowingly or unknowingly — to imagine its P-shape while viewing 
the object at the same time. When one make-perceives an object’s P-shape, one 
superimposes an off-line mental image of the object ’ s P-shape (perhaps created in 
 16  A related case discussed by  Wollheim (1980 , p. 218) is Leonardo da Vinci ’ s advice to the 
aspirant painter to look at the patterns on water-stained walls and imaginatively to attempt to 
 ‘ see ’ battle scenes and mysterious landscapes in them. Wollheim ’ s observation that such 
imaginative-visual experience is marked by a certain  ‘ indifference ’ between attending to that 
which is imaginatively projected (the battle scenes or landscapes) and attending to the world 
(the actual patterns on the wall) is directly relevant to the proposal made in this section. 
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short-term visual memory) on top of its on-line 3D shape. The effect, so to speak, 
is to trace the object ’ s P-shape on an imaginary pane of glass. 17 
 It is important to emphasize that the ease with which one make-perceives an 
object ’ s P-shape depends, among other things, on the object ’ s 3D shape and orien-
tation. Notably, one ’ s ability to make-perceive the simple and regular P-shape 
of a coin, or a tabletop, or a globe is typically effortless. Hence, the tendency, or so I 
have argued, to conﬂ ate the act of make-perceiving the P-shapes of these objects 
with the act seeing of their P-shapes. And, hence, as J. L. Austin points out, the 
sense-datum theorist ’ s  ‘ constant, obsessive repetition of the same small range of 
jejune  “ examples ” ’ (1962, p. 3). 
 According to this account, it is not necessary actually to see the P-shape that 
would occlude an object in order to notice it. One can make-perceive it instead. 
When seeing the object ’ s 3D shape, attention is directed to the object itself. 
When make-perceiving its 2D P-shape, by contrast, attention is directed to 
properties of an internally constructed mental image superimposed on the region 
occupied by the object in one ’ s ﬁ eld of view. For this reason, the depth 
information about the object ’ s surface orientation(s) is afforded by texture, 
shadows, reﬂ ections, etc., the easier it is to make-perceive its P-shape. Thus, 
when children learn to draw an object in perspective, they are sometimes taught 
to view the object with one eye shut or slightly to defocus their gaze, the 
intended effect in both cases being to suppress depth cues that might otherwise 
interfere with the task. Of course, in the absence of reliable information about 
depth, a 3D object  will  sometimes look ﬂ at or 2D (and vice versa, see  Ames, 
1951; King  et al. , 1976 ). It seems clear however that the possibility of such visual 
illusion under informationally impoverished viewing conditions by itself provides 
no support for the sense-datum theorist ’ s claims about what we see under normal, 
informationally rich viewing conditions. No more, say, than the possibility of 
mistaking a cow for a horse on a dark night provides support for the claim that 
cows look like horses in broad daylight. Two  different  visual experiences are at 
issue. 
 If the foregoing proposal is on the right track, then we do not, as Noë 
suggests, see an object ’ s 3D form in its 2D P-shape. Just the opposite is the case: 
we sometimes make-perceive its P-shape in its 3D form. I encourage the reader 
to choose a well-illuminated and irregularly shaped 3D object — i.e.  not  a coin, 
or a tabletop, or a globe — and to monitor carefully what you actually do in 
purposing to notice the object ’ s P-shape. Try to notice the object ’ s P-shape 
 without  ‘ tracing ’ its boundaries in imagination. I do not think you will succeed. 
The above account is put forward as an empirical hypothesis about what 
noticing an object ’ s P-shape consists in if P-shapes are not  visibilia and if noticing 
an object ’ s P-shape is not simply forming the judgment or belief that the object 
 17  This metaphor was suggested in conversation with Ruth Millikan. 
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has the P-shape in question. According to the account, Noë and other 
philosophers in the sense-datum tradition are right to maintain that we are 
sometimes able to notice an object ’ s P-shape if we try, but wrong to suppose 
that the act of noticing an object ’ s P-shape involves seeing its P-shape. Ernst 
Gombrich, J. J. Gibson, and, more recently, Eric Schwitzgebel (2006) have all 
plausibly suggested that philosophers in the sense-datum tradition over-analogize 
visual experience to painting, ﬁ lm, and other ﬂ at media: their theoretical 
presuppositions about visual experience distort their phenomenological 
pronouncements about what we see. It is an important implication of the 
present account, however, that philosophers in the sense-datum tradition are 
not only making a theoretical mistake. They are also making a psychological 
mistake. They are conﬂ ating the act of  imagining an object ’ s P-shape with the 
act of  seeing its P-shape.  
 I should emphasize that, if the account ﬁ nds empirical validation (and one 
Popperian virtue of the model is that experimental studies could in fact be 
devised to test it), then it dispenses with a question that has preoccupied 
philosophers at least since Locke: namely, the question of how an object can 
visually appear to instance  both  a certain 3D shape and a certain 2D perspectival 
shape at the same time. Indeed, it is this putative tension that leads Noë to claim 
that perceptual content is  ‘ radically ambiguous ’ (2004, p. 34) and that visual 
experience is rife with  ‘ dueling phenomenological facts ’ (2004, p. 78). The 
enactive account is intended to relieve this tension, to reconcile the fact that 
 ‘ perceptual experience represents the world as voluminous  …  and  that you 
cannot see anything in front of which an opaque surface is placed ’ (2004, p. 78). 
What I hope to have shown in the foregoing is that there is no such 
phenomenological conﬂ ict in visual experience. We perceive an object ’ s 3D 
shape, i.e. the orientation of its visible surfaces in depth, but we  make-perceive  its 
2D P-shape. We do not visually experience the object as both voluminous and 
ﬂ at at the same time. 
 5. Depth and the Perceptual Organization of Visible Surfaces 
 When we view the perspective projection of a scene in a painting or photograph, 
we see the projected scene in what Wollheim calls the conﬁ guration of the 
pictorial surface. The term  ‘ conﬁ guration ’ , however, is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, we see the projected scene in a certain unstructured, 2D array of colored 
points or  pixels  on the projection plane of the pictorial surface. In this sense, the 
conﬁ guration of the pictorial surface is something that could be adequately 
represented by means of assigning a certain hue, saturation, and brightness to 
every pixel in the picture. Call what would be represented by such a total 
assignment the  ‘ photometric-conﬁ guration ’ of the projection plane. On the 
other hand, we see the projected scene in a certain structured, 2D array of 
P-shapes (Ruskin ’ s  ‘ ﬂ at stains of colour ’ ). In this sense, the conﬁ guration of the 
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pictorial surface is something that could be adequately represented by means of 
outlining the visible contours of objects pictured in the image. Call what would 
be represented by such an outlining of P-shapes the  ‘ perspective-conﬁ guration ’ 
of the projection plane. (In the object recognition literature, this would be a 
complete segmentation of all discrete object boundaries in the corresponding 
2D image.) 
 We can also speak, of course, of the conﬁ guration of the distal scene beyond, i.
e. on the far side, of the projection plane. In viewing Seurat ’ s  A Sunday on La 
Grande Jatte  ( Figure  4 ), e.g. we perceive an organized, coherent array of objects and 
surfaces in 3D space. In particular, we see that certain objects in the scene are 
closer than others, i.e. closer to the pictorial point of view, and, in seeing this, we 
see how they occlude objects and surfaces that are farther away. The scene, in 
other words, has a certain 3D perceptual organization substantially characterized by 
relations of occlusion between objects and surfaces arrayed at different distances in 
depth. Call this distal, 3D organization the  ‘ depth-conﬁ guration ’ of the projected 
scene. 
 According to the enactive account, the perspective-conﬁ guration of the 
projection plane is  ‘ perceptually basic ’ . When we see an object, what we see, in 
the ﬁ rst instance, is its 2D P-shape. It is only in consequence of successfully 
matching its P-shape to a certain stored sensorimotor proﬁ le that we are able to 
perceive its 3D shape in depth. The enactive account, however, takes perceptual 
awareness of the perspective-conﬁ guration of the projection plane for granted. I.e. 
it provides no explanation of how the subject on the basis of information available 
to the eye perceptually individuates or segments 2D regions on the projection 
  
 Figure 4  Georges Seurat, A Sunday on La Grande Jatte, 1884-86, oil on canvas, 207.5 x 308.1 cm, 
Helen Birch Bartlett Memorial Collection (1926.224), Art Institute of Chicago (http://www.artic.
edu/aic). Photography © The Art Institute of Chicago. 
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plane that correspond to the contours (occluding edges) of 3D objects in the distal 
scene. E.g., when Noë discusses the example of the tilted coin, he simply assumes 
that we are able to segment the elliptical 2D P-shape of the coin as ﬁ gure from 
background. 
 The trouble is that there is nothing intrinsic to the photometric-conﬁ guration 
of the pictorial projection plane — or, crucially, the retinal image — that determines 
a unique perspective-conﬁ guration. As David Marr writes: 
 Regions that have  ‘ semantic ’ importance do not always have any particular 
visual distinction. Most images are too complex, and even the very simplest, 
smallest images … often do not contain enough information in the pure 
intensity arrays to segment them into different objects (1982, p. 270). 
 Edges that ought to be signiﬁ cant are either absent from an image or almost 
so … and the strongest changes are often changes in illumination that have 
nothing to do with meaningful relations in a scene (1982, p. 272). 
 In the present context, the point is that were we to segment the image projected 
by a typical, real-world scene, e.g. a densely cluttered forest setting, solely on 
the basis of the most abrupt luminance intensity transitions in the image, the 
segmentation achieved would not reliably correspond to the contours of the objects 
visible in the scene. It would not match the perspective-conﬁ guration of the 
projection plane. Many objects would be  ‘ broken up ’ by the patterns of light and 
shadow in the image. 
 An equally important consideration is the fact of occlusion. It is a consequence 
of inhabiting a 3D world that near objects very often partially hide objects farther 
away. (Again, think of a typical forest setting with crisscrossing branches and 
overlapping leaves.) A medium-sized region on the projection plane, in normal 
environmental contexts, will typically contain points projected by multiple 
surfaces at different distances in depth from the viewer. Which points in the 2D 
photometric-conﬁ guration map onto which object surfaces in the 3D depth-
conﬁ guration is not something that in general can be read directly off the intrinsic 
properties of the former. Since this mapping, however, is what determines 
the perspective-conﬁ guration of the projection plane, it again follows that the 
perspective-conﬁ guration of the projection plane is extrinsic to its photometric-
conﬁ guration. 
 In what follows, I argue that which perspective-conﬁ guration, which structured 
array of P-shapes, is perceived on a projection plane psychologically depends on 
perception of the depth-conﬁ guration of the projected scene. Our ability 
perceptually to individuate P-shapes on a 2D projection plane depends on our 
more basic ability perceptually to individuate objects and surfaces in the 3D 
projected world. 
This point can initially be brought out by looking at some uncomplicated 
examples of the role played by depth perception in perceptual organization. 
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Consider  ﬁ gures  5a and 5b . In  Figure  5a , our perception is bi-stable: which region 
of the image we see as ﬁ gure and which as ground reverses. The bi-stability in the 
perception can be explained in terms of the bi-stability in the perceived order of 
depth ( Nakayama  et al. , 1995 ). When perceived as closer, the white region is seen 
as an occluding surface, with the black region continuing behind. With a perceptual 
re-ordering of depth,  ‘ ownership ’ of the border between two regions ﬂ ips, and the 
reverse occlusion relation is perceived to obtain. In  Figure  5b , we effortlessly and 
automatically see what appears to be a white surface partially occluded by a grey 
strip. That is, a grey strip appears to be closer in depth and to hide parts of a white 
surface that complete behind it. Our visual impression is not of four unrelated 
image regions on the same plane of depth.
 These simple examples serve to illustrate the point that the perceptual organization 
of visual experience crucially depends on preconscious processing of  depth relations 
 between surfaces and other perceptual units. The structure of visual experience 
reﬂ ects the physically signiﬁ cant spatial structure of the distal, environmental scene —
 what I have called its  ‘ depth conﬁ guration ’ — rather than the photometrically 
signiﬁ cant properties of the scene ’ s 2D plane projection. In the next section, using 
more sophisticated examples, I shall provide more evidence that our ability to 
impose a certain perspective-conﬁ guration on the photometric-conﬁ guration 
of the projection plane is psychologically reliant on our ability to perceive the 
depth-conﬁ guration of the 3D world beyond the projection plane. 
 6. Surface Representation and Object Recognition 
 A forceful and inﬂ uential argument for the perceptual priority of surface layout in 
depth has been made by Ken Nakayama and his colleagues (1995). Such surface 
representation, they argue,  ‘ is a necessary intermediate form of perceptual 
representation, one that forms an appropriate foundation for other visual 
  
 Figure  5a and 5b  Depth and perceptual organization. 
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functions — object recognition, object manipulation, and locomotion ’ ( Nakayama  et al. , 
1995 , p. 25). 18 In what follows, I focus on their case in relation to object recognition. 
 Consider ﬁ rst  Figure  6a (overleaf) . When we look at the ﬁ gure, our visual 
impression is of eight, separate, 2D image fragments on the  same  plane of depth. 
We may with prolonged inspection imagine the fragments as joining to form a 
Necker cube, but that is not what we in the ﬁ rst instance see. 
 Next consider  Figure  6b . The visual impression of a 3D Necker cube is now 
quite vivid. There is no tendency to see eleven separate, co-planar image 
fragments, i.e. the eight original image fragments plus three additional strips. It is 
important to recognize that the perception of  occlusion  in the image is responsible 
for this effect ( Kanizsa, 1979 ). Since the surfaces of the three, co-planar strips in 
6b are perceived as in front, they  ‘ own ’ the borders between them and the surface 
regions that are perceived as behind. (The relevant pictorial depth cues here are 
the  ‘ T-junctions ’ in the image, which in accordance with the so-called  ‘ law of 
generic views ’ , 19 specify the  ‘ caps ’ on the junctions as in front and the  ‘ stems ’ as 
behind.) And since surfaces that do not own borders are effectively unbounded, 
they can connect to other unbounded surfaces and amodally complete behind 
their occluders ( Nakayama  et al. , 1995 ). The point of relevance is that there is 
nothing intrinsic to the photometric-conﬁ guration of 6b that dictates how 2D 
image fragments in the ﬁ gure are either to be grouped or segregated. Visual 
awareness of the 3D cube depends rather on the perception of occlusion and, so, 
on the perception of the depth conﬁ guration of visible surfaces pictured in the 
image. 
Not surprisingly, similar results obtain in connection with stereoscopic depth. 
By switching left and right images in a stereogram it is possible to reverse 
perceived depth in a scene without changing the total amount of monocular 
visual information available to the two eyes. Such reversal of depth can cause 
fundamental changes in the perceived 3D layout and grouping of surfaces. This 
is illustrated by  Figure  7a – 7c on p.487 adapted from Takeichi  et al ., 1992. Each 
image in 7a consists of a Kanizsa  ‘ illusory ’ triangle and three diamonds. Cross-
fusing the stereopair on the left side of 7a has the effect that the diamonds 
appear nearer in depth to the observer than the triangle and its inducers. The 
result is shown in 7b. Notably, the triangle in 7b appears as a  ﬁ gure  in front of 
three (amodally completed) disks. The perceived disparities in depth can be 
inverted — again, without changing the total amount of monocular visual 
information available to the two eyes — by switching the left and right eye ’ s 
views. This is achieved by cross-fusing the stereopair on the right side of 7a. 
 18  For recent ﬁ ndings in support of this thesis, see  Johnson and Olshausen, 2005 . 
 19  The law of generic views asserts that the visual system when confronted with more than one 
possible surface interpretation of a scene assumes the viewer is seeing the scene from a 
 ‘ generic ’ , i.e. a non-accidental, vantage point. The most probable interpretation of 6b is that 
of a partially occluded cube rather than some accidental arrangement of eleven discrete, 2D 
surfaces. See  Hoffman, 1998 for discussion. 
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The effect now is that the diamonds appear to be behind the plane of the 
inducers. The result is shown in 7c. As  Fleming and Anderson (2004) point 
out,  ‘ this simple inversion leads to a change in surface representation that is 
more complex than a simple reversal in the depth ordering of the perceptual 
units ’ (pp. 1286-1287). When the diamonds recede, they  ‘ drag ’ their background 
  
 Figure  6a and 6b  Occlusion, perceptual grouping, and recognition. (From  Kanizsa 1979 by kind 
permission of the Greenwood Publishing Group.) 
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back with them. Notably, the triangle now appears as a  hole  in a surface through 
which the observer can see the diamonds.
 There are two main points. First, the perspective-conﬁ guration of 7b, i.e. its 
segmentation into distinct P-shapes, is clearly signiﬁ cantly different than the 
perspective-conﬁ guration of 7c. The example thus illustrates the way in which the 
perceptual organization of visual experience varies dramatically with changes in ap-
parent (stereoscopic) depth. Second, prior to the process of object recognition — or 
prior to the process of matching a 2D P-shape to a stored sensorimotor proﬁ le — an 
object must be segmented, i.e. its boundaries must be isolated, from the rest of the 
image. What these and other examples show is that such segmentation can crucially 
depend on perceived depth relations between visible surfaces in the image. It cannot 
  
 Figure  7a-7c  Large-scale change in surface representation with reversal of perceived depth. (From 
 Fleming and Anderson, 2004 by kind permission of MIT Press.) 
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in general be achieved solely on the basis of intrinsic, 2D image features. Thus 
Nakayama  et al.  write: 
 [O]ur perception of recognizable objects can be dramatically inﬂ uenced by 
visual surface representation  … . Rather than being used to represent the 
internal three-dimensional structure of the objects themselves, depth has a 
more important role:  it determines what pieces of an image actually comprise the 
object to be recognized.  Depth is needed to parse objects into wholes or parts, to 
determine what in an image actually constitutes the parts and boundaries of a 
single object. In other words, depth dictates perceptual grouping and perceptual 
segmentation (1995, pp. 13-14, my emphasis). 
 The relevant implication in the present context is that perception of an object ’ s 
3D shape cannot in general proceed from prior visual awareness of the object ’ s 
P-shape, because visual discrimination of the object as ﬁ gure from ground and, 
so visual discrimination of its P-shape, depends upon prior perception of the 
way visible surfaces in the scene are arrayed in depth. 20 
 The enactive account, like the classical sense-datum theory of perception, is 
premised on the assumption that  ‘ perceptual awareness is, in the ﬁ rst instance, an 
awareness of perspectival qualities ’ ( Noë, 2004 , p. 165). The phenomenological 
evidence reviewed in this section amply shows that this assumption is false. While 
some of the points made above were made in connection with perception of depth 
in pictures, they apply with full vigor to perception of depth in actual scenes. The 
idea integral to the enactive account that we are visually aware of the shape of the 
2D patch on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight that would occlude an object 
presupposes that the relevant patch has already been segmented as ﬁ gure from 
ground. What we have seen is that such segmentation strongly depends upon prior 
perception of the 3D structure or  ‘ depth conﬁ guration ’ of the visible scene. If this 
is right, then it provides vivid demonstration that P-properties cannot play the 
perceptually basic role conferred on them by the enactive account. 
Although space does not permit adequate discussion, I should mention in 
concluding this section that Noë ’ s discussions of  apparent lightness  are also enfeebled 
by an inattention to the role of depth. Noë rightly observes that  ‘ The way a thing 
looks with respect to  … brightness depends not only on viewing geometry and 
lighting, but also on the chromatic properties of surrounding and contrasting 
objects ’ (2004, p. 125). He omits to mention, however, that that the  albedo  or 
apparent lightness of a surface is dependent not only on its perceived adjacency to 
 20  This last claim, I should point out, would be contested by many researchers in the visual 
object recognition ﬁ eld (see  Edelman, 1999 for relevant discussion). There are many 
computational approaches that pursue segmentation solely on the basis of 2D image features. 
To the best of my knowledge, however, no such approach works robustly, i.e. reliably well 
across a wide variety of scenes in ecologically realistic viewing conditions. 
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other surfaces in the retinal image — and, by extension, its perceived adjacency to 
other surfaces in what I have been calling the perspective-conﬁ guration of the 
projection plane — but also on its perceived position relative to other surfaces and 
orientation in 3D space ( Gilchrist, 1977, 1980; Rock, 1983 , chap. 9;  Knill and 
Kersten, 1991; Anderson, 1999, 2003 ). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the 
apparent lightness of a region of the visual ﬁ eld can be switched from white to 
black by varying its apparent depth relative to other regions. A quite striking 
example of this effect is provided by  ﬁ gure  8a from  Anderson and Winawer, 2005. 
In  Figure  8a , the corresponding disk regions on the light and dark surrounds are 
physically isoluminant (pixel for pixel), but the disks on the light surround are 
perceived as uniformly dark objects behind intervening light haze, whereas the 
  
 Figure  8a and 8b  (a) The corresponding disks on the light and dark surrounds are physically identical, 
but the disks on the light surround appear as dark objects seen through semi-transparent light haze, 
whereas the disks on the dark surround appear as light objects seen through semi-transparent dark haze. 
(b) Rotating the surround 90° destroys both the perception of transparency and the lightness illusion. 
(From  Anderson and Winawer, 2005 by kind permission of the Nature Publishing Group.) 
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disks on the dark surround appear as uniformly light objects behind intervening 
dark haze. Crucially, this lightness illusion is to be explained by the way the 
difference in the lightness of the surround modulates the perception of transparency 
inside disk regions. More precisely, whether a disk in the example appears as light 
or dark depends on the way the visual system uses the lightness of the surround in 
order to segment the contrasting luminances that deﬁ ne the texture inside the 
occluding boundary of the disk into discrete light and dark surfaces  at different 
distances in depth . The process whereby the visual system achieves perception of 
transparency by segmenting multiple surfaces in depth along a single line of sight is 
known as  ‘ scission ’ ( Koffka, 1935 ). For present purposes, the details of this process 
needn ’ t concern us (but for careful explanation, see  Anderson, 2003 and  Fleming 
and Anderson, 2004 ). What matters is that when the surround is light, the grey 
regions, i.e. intermediate luminances, in the texture are interpreted as dark matter 
seen behind semi-transparent light matter. When the surround is dark, the inverse 
relationship in depth between the light and dark surfaces is perceived to obtain, 
and the grey regions in the texture are interpreted as light matter seen behind dark 
matter. That segmentation processes involved in the perception of transparency 
play a critical role in this lightness illusion is shown by the fact that rotating the 
surround in the ﬁ gure 90° not only contravenes the photometric and geometrical 
conditions needed to induce perception of transparency, but also destroys the 
lightness illusion. This is illustrated by  Figure  8b , in which the disks appear neither 
uniformly white, nor uniformly black.
 What this last example demonstrates is that the way a thing looks with respect to 
brightness depends not only on viewing geometry and lighting conditions, and not 
only on the photometric properties of surrounding and contrasting objects, but also 
on the apparent  distance in depth  of its visible surfaces. In particular, whether the disks 
in the example appear uniformly white (as in 8a right), uniformly black (as in 8a left), 
or neither (as in 8b left and right), depends on whether conditions obtain such that 
a white surface appears to be visible through the medium of a dark surface or vice 
versa. The general phenomenological point to take away from this discussion is thus 
that the way a thing looks with respect to brightness can no more be extricated from 
the thing ’ s perceived placement in 3D space than can the way the thing looks with 
respect to shape. In both cases, depth is perceptually basic to visual experience. 
 7. Conclusion: The Sense-Datum Theory Refuted 
 In his recent  ‘ Real Presence ’ , Noë chides philosophers who deny that the content 
of visual experience is  ‘ two-dimensional ’ , i.e. that visual experience represents  both 
 objective spatial properties and apparent or  ‘ perspectival ’ spatial properties: 
 Philosophers have tended to chicken out when it comes to the two-dimensional 
character of perceptual experience. They deny the legitimacy of one or the 
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other dimensions of content. Sense-datum theorists deny that we visually 
experience the [tilted] coin ’ s circularity  … . Direct realists, in contrast, may be 
tempted to deny that there is any sense in which it is  the coin  that looks elliptical 
 … (forthcoming, ms. p. 2). 
 In denying that when we see a 3D object we are able to see its P-shape, am I 
denying that there is an important sense in which the content of visual experience 
has a  ‘ perspectival ’ dimension? Am I, as Noë puts it,  ‘ chickening out ’ ? 
 The answer is: it depends. On the one hand, I reject, to quote A. D. Smith, 
 ‘ an account that postulates the existence of phenomenally 2D conscious states at 
a level that is prior to the operation of the [perceptual] constancies, and hence 
prior to 3D spatial awareness ’ (2000b, p. 509). I reject the view that we are 
visually aware of 2D P-properties (and, hence, that P-properties are  ‘ perceptually 
basic ’ ). P-properties are real, relation properties of visible objects, but, unless 
we are looking at a picture of an object, they are not properties that we can, in 
any literal sense, be said to see. Noë, like the classical sense-datum theorists, 
mistakes the act of  make-perceiving  an object ’ s P-shape for the act of seeing its 
P-shape (§4). 
 On the other hand, I do think that there is an important and perfectly intuitive 
sense in which visual experience  does  have a perspectival dimension: When a 
perceiver views an object, what she sees is a function of the object ’ s intrinsic 
spatial properties and her changing, extrinsic perspective on it. Indeed, if by an 
object ’ s  ‘ appearance ’ , we understand simply whatever 3D part or region of the 
object is visible from the perceiver ’ s current point of view, then it is clear that 
the object ’ s apparent spatial properties are perspectival. They vary systematically 
as the perceiver varies her perspective, and the perceiver is aware of this ( Brewer, 
1997, chap. 6 ). The important point is that it is possible to allow that an object ’ s 
apparent spatial properties are perspectival or  ‘ egocentric ’ in this intuitive, low 
proﬁ le sense, but to deny that they are in any sense ﬂ at or 2D. Hence, contrary 
to Noë, there is no tension or  ‘ apparent conﬂ ict ’ in visual experience between 
how an object perspectivally appears to the perceiver as she moves and her 
awareness of the object ’ s actual, 3D spatial properties (2004, pp. 78-79). An object ’ s 
visual appearance or  ‘ look ’ is simply the objective, environmentally situated, 3D 
part or region of the object that is visible from the perceiver ’ s current point 
of view. 
 In  The Structure of Behavior , Merleau-Ponty writes that  ‘ when one speaks of the 
perspectival character of knowledge, the expression is equivocal ’ : 
 It can signify that only the perspectival projection of objects would be 
given to primitive knowledge; and in this sense the expression is inexact 
since the ﬁ rst reactions of an infant are adapted, e.g., to the distance of 
objects — a fact that excludes the idea of a phenomenal world originally 
without depth. 
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 At the same time, the perspectival character of knowledge, provides perception 
 … with the assurance of communicating with a world that is richer than 
what we know of it, that is, of communicating with a real world ( 1963 , 
pp. 186-87). 
 I am in full agreement with Merleau-Ponty that it is in the latter sense, but not 
the former, that seeing has an intrinsically perspectival dimension. This is not, as 
Noë puts it, to  ‘ chicken out ’ . It is to reject a deeply rooted philosophical dogma 
about the distinction between appearance and reality in visual perception. 
 Philosophy Department 
 Ohio University 
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